The paper begins with an overview of contemporary liberal-egalitarian theories
in order to show the diversity among different understandings of justice.
Then, the paper draws a borderline between luck egalitarianism (Arneson, G.
A. Cohen, Roemer) and a pro-democratic, relational egalitarianism (Rawls, J.
Cohen, Anderson, Barry) that focuses on the society’s structure, i.e. the production
of its inner relations.
The following part introduces the idea of reflective equilibrium and its theoretical
benefits in terms of “de-metaphysised” ethics. Furthermore, this part
elaborates Dworkin’s liberal principle of justice as the basis of his liberal moral
Finally, the paper shows that a “de-metaphysised” ethics could not be equated
with the conception of justice as mutual advantage, and neither is it lost in an
Archimedean skepticism. By referring to Barry’s work, the paper elaborates
the idea of justice as impartiality through the debate between moral objectivism
The paper ends with synthesising a conclusion of the previous three parts.
Also, it defines justice as implied by Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism. Ultimately,
the paper identifies the need for further research of the topic that would elaborate
and answer the questions highlighted by this paper.
Egalitarianism; Justice; Rawls; Dworkin; Barry