Lijphart and Horowitz in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Institutional Design for Conflict Resolution or Conflict Reproduction?

Original scientific paper

Mirjana Kasapović ; Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

Fulltext: english, pdf (293 KB) pages 174-190 cite

The author analyses the prerequisites and consequences of the implementation of different conflict management mechanisms, consociational and centripetal, in deeply divided societies, by looking at the “Komšić case” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The case concerns the election of the Croat member to the three-member Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Owing to the revision of electoral patterns laid down in the “Dayton Constitution” of 1995, prerequisites were created for the election of the Serb member of the Presidency by Serbs, the Bosniak member by Bosniaks, whereas only the Croat member could not be elected by Croats. Consequently, the Croat member of the Presidency was elected by votes of Bosniaks in the 2006 and 2010 presidential elections. This led to a political and constitutional crisis in the country.

Bosnia and Herzegovina; Conflict Management; Komšić Case; Lijphart; Horowitz

Hrčak ID: 177261